exploitation and have started to fundamentally change their destiny. it i5 appropriate here to remember that even the early official statements of the Revolutionary Government revealed an impatience to thoro.ughly transform the Libyan society. In his first major address on September 16, 1969,' a fortnight after the Revalutian (delivered on the thirty-eighth anniversary of the mart yrd om of Omar Mukhtar), Kaddafi outlined the n:ajor themes of the ideology which he was to develop soon.
Libya had seen other courageous political movements in the past. The Sanusi movement of the Nineteenth Century, for instance, spread a religious and social system from Cyrenia to different parts of north Africa. But the monarchy not only failed tobridge the division between the urban minority İlı Tripoli and the tribal hinterland, but even accentuated it by allowing oil wealth to further divide the Libyans into "Westernized haves" and the traditional "have-nots".
In the now-famous Benghazi address on September 16, 1969, on the other hand, Kaddafi said that th~people were "the leader" and that the individual would be liberated from "degradation, oppression, ignorance ... slavery ... poverty and backwardness." One has to concede that in terms of overturning the old order, the Libyan Revolution is perhaps "one of the most radical the world has seen".2 Kaddafi was himself bom "in a tent" in Sirte. 3 In an interview with Le Figaro, reprinted in aI-Y~wm, October 1, 1969,he stated that his parents "stilllive in a tent." "Libyan brand of Arab socialisrn" was initially based on the Egyptian example, but has certainly gone beyond it. it is not Marxist. it shares a number of characteristics with the other variaties of "Arab socialisrn". But even an official Washington publication describes it with roots in local history and custom. 4 In an Ajdabiyah address on September 18, 1969, an RCC members stated that the principals of the Revalutian were "not imported". Nascent ideology gained legal expressian in the interim constitutional pradamatian of December 11, 1969, which summarized the goals of the Revalutian as freedam, socialism and unity (hurriyah, ishtirakiyyah THE U.S.A. -UBYAN CONFRONTATION 27 tion of Libya from the imperialists, the neo-colonialists andthe reactionaries; and the emancipation of the entire Arab world. He refers to "socialism" as a solution to man' s economic problems. Libyan brand of socialism is alsa "nationalistic", which may be typical in an area where socialism and nationalism are found together. Pdint 3 of the five-point declaration of the RCC stated on September 1, 1969 , that "socialism sprang from the heart of the nation". it was the "socialism of Islam";5 they were merely heading towards a "society of equality and justice". There would be "no imitatian of any foreign system, whether it be the Soviet Union or anather country."6 The spirit of Islam was "not incompatible with socialism.>ı1But it was alsa "a necessity for the removal of the overwhelming majority of the people from poverty."8 On November 7, 1969, Kaddafi said in Tobruk: "In other countries, people were able to land a man on the moon. Here, under client-monarchy and colonialist bases, we liye in tents without electricity or even water".
For about four years, Kaddafi differentiated between domestic and foreign capitalists and encouraged indigenous capitaL. When a three-year plan was announced in 1973, the re was sizable private sector in Libyan economy. The first five-year plan of 1976 envisioned an annual increase of 25 percent in industrial output: In the second five-year plan of 1981, self-sufficiency in industrial production became the goal of the regime. it was after 1975 that Kaddafi's theories were expressed in terms of laws tightening controlover private enterprise. This action went hand in hand with a "cuıtural revolution" (aI-thawra ath-thaqafiyya) that created the "popular committees" (aI-Iejan ash-sha'abiyya) supervising the country's administration. As the committee system expanded, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) came to an end. In 1975, the General People's Congress (al-mukhtaınar ash-sha'ab al-a'am) was established, with Kaddafi as its Secretary-General (al-amen aI-a'am), as the .umbrella organization for the popular committees. This was how Kaddafi interpreted the following Koranic phrase: "They shall run their affairs by consultation."
By the time the second part of the Grecn Book (al-Kitab al-Ahbar) was pubnshed in 1978, the economy had already undergone considerable change. With the announcement of Resolution Four by the General People's Congress in March 1978, all Libyans were given the right to own homes. in September 1978, workers rushed to take over about two-hundred 28 TüRKKAYA ATAOV enterprises. In May 1980, all currency in denominations larger than one Libyan dinar was declared void, and citizens had a week to exchange their money. The maximum exchange was set at one-thousand dinars. At the beginning of 1981, it was announced that the state would take over by the end of the year all import, export and distribution functions. Private retail trade has stopped. There are now a series of state-run supermarkets in all cities and towns, replacing the private sectoro The religious endowment lands (vaqf) were also expropriated. In other words, wealth, eithei as land, capital, housing or business, is significantly redistributed. No doubt, the practice of socialism in Libya has been mare fundamental than that of its neighbours.
The replacement of the Libyan embassies by the people's bureaus (al-mektab ash-sha'abe) in Iate 1979 and early 1980,was another manifestation of search for !lew forms of governance based on popular participation. In the mid-1970s, ci People's Army supplemented the regular armed forces with anation of reservists.
Kaddafi's beliefs has many things in common with the ideologies of other Arab revolutionary movements. They may be described as heterogeneous, but theyare committed to radical changes in the direction of mo-. dernization, especially in a political dimate in which the equation of development with Westernization is rejected. The applications of Libyan socialism in terms of property rights and wages separate Kaddafi from Nasser and the Ba'th. His ideology justifies utilizing Western technology to operate an oil economy without going through an alienation that may come with it. The Revolution devoted a large part of the oil income to the creation of a public sector.
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY:
The foreign policy pursued by Libya has been influenced by thehistory,ı0 geography and social patterns of what was Tripolitania, Cyrenaica Libya was the last country to be colonized in North Africa and the first to be decolonized. ıtalian occupation was a kind of settler colonialism, which some Libyans liken to South Africa and IsraeL it was marked by bloody wars and a few decades of exploitation.
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The last phase of ıtalian supremacy was fascist rule, which sought to redefine values in its own framework. it cannot be denied that the Libyan people have developed an anti-fascist and an anti-Nazi stand.
, The people have seen the collaboreı.tion~tween the ıtalian invaders and some privileged Libyans who wanted to preserve the ir status. The people have realized in their past a .general mobilization of tribal forces, coordinated by the Sanusi leader Ahmad al-Sharif and a group of Ottornan Turkish offi~ers,ı3 who chose to stay in Libya. In 1915, they defeated the Italians, who were forced to withdraw to three centers on the coast. were quiekly used up. The monarehy, nevertheless, sought to minünize foreign impaet on Libyan soeiO-politieal structures and underlined that it was pursuing a policy of non-alignment.
The Libyan monarchy had a deficit economy before oil exports ehanged its economic fortunes. Oil, discovered in 1959, ehanged the emphasis of the monarchy's foreign policy. On February 23, 1964, Libya formally requested a re~onsider~tion of the status of the military bases. A year later, the United Kingdom began evacuating troops from Tripoli, and the U.S. Government agreed to withdraw from Wheelus Field. The monarchy threatened to shut down this base and briefly stopped oil production, to keep abreast with the popular reaction to the Israeli aggression in 1967. However, a new phase of Libyan history began on September 1, 1969. 15 The Revolutionary government has been able to put past legacies into effed. Libya has been united for the first time in its history. The hinterland is now a part of . national life. in 1951, two distinct political legacies, namely, the Republic at Tripoli and the Sanusi Amirate, had joined in a reluctant partnership. These two contending legacies persisted until 1969. Not only the former tribal people,but alsa all citizens later developed the feeling of direct participation in the affairs of their society.
The Revolutionary leadership had to return to the theme of injustice and indignity that the Arabs had suffered in Western hands. Libya became opposed to turning itself and its neighbours into entrepots for American or other foreign interests. The RCC, that planned and executed the Revolution, emphasized that the neW republic was an Arab state, that it would be non-aligned and that it would be against all forms of colonialism and imperialism. The Revolutionary government expanded many policies initiated by the monarchy. For instance, the Libyan people had supported the Palestinians since 1947, and with the discovery of oil, even the monarchy had sought to limit Western influence. But the policies of the Revolutionary government were in many ways radical departures from those of the monarchy. it was the first Arab state to promote Arab unity. Correctly observed by Nathan Alexander,16 "advocacy by the rich of union with the poor was a complete reversal of a long-standing pattern in the Arab world." For the first time, the government had combined oil and pan-Arabism, which had been at odds in recent past. Part 1 of the Constitutional Prodamation of 'Decembel' 11, 1969, described Libya as an Arab democratic republic whose people constituted part of the "Arab Nation" (al-Umma al-Arabiyya) and whose objective was Arab unity. In the first Proclamation of the Republic on the Ist of September, 1969, the makers of the Revolution stated that they wished to reviye their heritage and "revenge an honour wounded. and a right usurped". They referred to the "holy war" of Omar Mukhtar and to the struggle of Ahmad al-Sharif. The leadership began pressuring the British and the American Governments for an early termination of the agreement. As "one of the reasons of the Revolution," Kaddafi, in a address in Tripoli on November 28, 1969, singled out "the foreigner" (al-ajnabi), who was "in control' everywhere". 17 In the early 1970's, the RCC pursued a policy of neutralizing the Mediterranean. it felt that the use of the air and naval installations in Malta by the United Kingdom gaye excessiye influence to foreign powers. The Libyan people started opposing racism with every weapon. For instance, workers at the oil port of Hariqa refused to help the American tanker Atlantic Courage lift Libyan oil when they found out that the tanker had had dealings with the South African racist regime. In an effort to isoIate Israel in Africa south of the Sahara, Libya felt obliged to support governments like those of President Idi Amin of Uganda l8 and Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Empire. While Libyan leadership aimed to achieve "complete sovereignty" (al-istiqlal at-tam), as so expressed by Kaddafi in a Tripoli meeting on November 28, 1969, it still hoped to preserve the friendship of the Ameri-. can and British peoples. The Libyan Government, nevertheless, maintained close commercial relations with the West, selling oil in return for technology. Libyan university students generally went to the United States (and not to the Soviet Union) for education.
Anti-colonial actions in the economic life of the country began within a fortnight of the seizure of power when the RCC announced that the foreign banks were expected to form Libyan joint stock companies with at least 51 percent of the shares owned by the government. In Iate 1970 and the beginning of 1971, the government negotiated major concessions from the oil companies. By the fourth anniversary of the Revolution, nationalization had become widespread.
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Parallel with the drive towards more equality within the Jamahiriya, the Libyan leadership has pursued policies for a New International Economic Order (al-Nitham al-iqtisadi al-jadid baynash-shuub). The former metropolitan countries are largely responsible for the poverty, backwardness and the plight of the Third World, including Africa. Through the mechanism of transfer prices and monetary machinations the international monopolies have taken out of the Third World sums far exceeding the value of all aid. This unequal status is forcing them to fight for a revision of their status. The young states of Africa are waging a struggle for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Libya among them insists on areorganization of the entire system. it demands fair prices when exchanging raw materials for finished goods, full access of their goods to Western markets, the abolition of trade restrictions and better terms for obtaining technology. The Plan of Action enumerated that (a) Africa's huge resources must be applied principally to meet the needs and purposes of its people, (b) Africa's almost total reliance on the export of raw materials must change, (c) Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance and (d). Africa must mobilize her entire human and material resources for her development. Libya has not differed from this strategy of development; it has, moreover, vigorously pursued its implementation.
U.S. CONFRONTATION:
According to President Reagan and his team, the "fact" is that the conflict with the Soviet Union is the supervening struetural feature of the Middle East and Africa. The American public is not yet aware of the extent to which Arab nationalism or Islamic resurgence or quest foı equitable relations impose a degree of tolerance in the face of a challenge that rejects "values" dear to President Reagan. Will it be possil;>lefor the U.S. Government to overcome the wide gap in ctıltural understanding between "thern" and "us"?
The publication of an artiele in the Foreign Affairs 20 journal, on how U.S. foreign policy ought to be conducted coincided with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States.
The "hawks" had started scoring success in the last months of the Ford Administration. The Carter Administration had agreed to increase U.S. military spending. And in the run-up to the 1980 elections, it was Reagan who responded favourably to the agenda drawn up by the hawks. Reagan's general approach towards detente was mirrored in his statements, on the Middle East. Not only he placed alliance with Israelabove any contact with the Arabs, but also Israel was, in his eyes, the military offset to the Soviet Union.
Born into a "damned poor" home, the converted Reagan of the 1960's began fund-raising for the national public relations director of the John Birch Society, Congressman John Rousselot. Ronnie Dugger 1 shows that no president in modern times has so effectively undermined minorities, labor unions, social securlty, civil liberties, consumer protection, safety in the work-place, small business and the needs of farmers. He opposed every major civil rights bill and halted federal enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. Reminding his personal Presidential hero, Calvin Coolidge, Reagan slashes human needs programs as "budget savings", providing relief for those in the higher tax brackets because of their "great~r ability" to invest. He is committed to the arms race, nuelear superiority, first strike capability and to the beHef, that a nuclear war can be fought in such a way as to allow the U.S. to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination on terms favorable to the U.S. The President gives the impression that he seeks to return to the era of "Red-scare" at home and abroad. In a number of important issues, a "free people" are behaving with Pavlovian conformity.22 is the United States still a land governed by the people? if two percent of the population owns or controls over two-thirds of the nation's wealth, then the "American way of life" is really a matter of power, and those who own much of the information industry as well also dictate what is reported and what serves their interests. The American welfare state has given way to a succession of multinational oligopolies in banking and industry.
Consequently, some American writers 23 view with alarm the events that they attribute to the "ineptitude" of leaders charged with the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. For instance, some 24 believe that the revolution in Iran could have been averted by the timely use of repressive military force' on the part of the Shah, and that consequently its occurrence was due to some failure of the U.S. Government in terms of tactical errors, lack of information and indecisiveness. This outlook is the same as that of the CIA, when it intervened in Iran back in 1953. The "defects", on the other hand, are more deeply imbedded in the American form of governing, domestic and foreign, which would like to stop the clock. The press sees the Middle East and African developments through tbe prism of powerful American interests, centering on oil, Israel and strategy. Although the U.S. possesses large reserves of a great many essential minerals, a number of critical items are obtained from other countries -such as oil from the Gulf, bauxite from Jamaica, cobalt from Zaire or tin from Malaysia. In addition to its dependence on Arab oil, the U.S. is obsessed with WestSoviet confrontation, which poses a threat to world peace.
In the Middle East, the United States is categorically committed to the preservation and the defense of Israel and its interests. 25 In spite of differences and even tensions between the present Israeli Government and the Reagan Administration, the re isgreat affinity between the two. The In respect to Africa, the U.S. does not want to abandon this continent to the Africans. For years, the public was told that the United States had no African policy -while American corporatiöns were investing billions of dollars in South Africa, while the U.S. Government was supporting Portuguese colonial wars and while the CIA was roaming in several African countries. Under Reagan, the U.S. concentrated in cons~1idating its front pn the eastern border of northern Africa. To this end, it continued to work activeIyat destabilizing those regimes opposed to the aims of the 'u.S. Within this context, Libyan foreign and domestic policies have become subjects of fervent debate in the United States during the Reagan Administration. Some American writings,28 however, concede that much of the debate on Libya took place with little or no appreciation of the historical context and the local phenomena in Libya. Differences in world outlook and interest are at the heart of the growing impasse between the U.S. and Libya. Reagan's policy towards Libya may be described as "provocative".29 The U.S. has been an enemy of Libya since 1969. The new Libyan regime had dismantled American bases, nationalized oil companies and pursued a policy of non-alignment. Ever since the Libyans forced the Americans out of their country, Libya has been a thorn in the American side.
. In the eyes of Libya, Big Business, which dominates American politics, is guided by narrowand selfish interests. Just as there is practically no erime ldt uncommitted in the United States, attacks on countries of the Middle East and Americaand subversive operations have become standard actions of the Reagan Administration. Libya feels that the U.S. Administration has been resorting to the use of force ever more frequently, modifying only the forms of its use depending oncircumstances. The U.S. arms and dispatches numerous bands which terrorize the peaceful population. This is sometimes done to the accompaniment of threats to use U.S. armed units. Such threats are at times backed by the concentration of U.S. naval forces near the shores of these countries and flights of military aircraft over their air space.
Libya, which is "radical" in its support of forces seeking change in the world system, has no ne€d of U.S. "aid". Other "radical" Arab countries, such as Syria or South Yemen, do nothave the economic independer.ce to challenge the U.S. Hence, Libya is a target of the American Government. There have beel'). frequent calls for the overthrow of the Libyan Government by force. Libya is no country's pawn. Libya feels that, under the pretext of opposing Soviet ascendancy, the U.S. tries to strengthen its own controlover Third World nations and to hold back the tide of change. Since the 1969 Revolution,Libya has always been against foreign warships to enter Libyan territorial waters. it has not permitted the Soviets to use its ports or airfields. The only Soviet naval visit took place in May 1969 when the King still ruled. On the other hand, which nation has become a member of the Soviet bloc because it has bought Soviet aircraft, missiles or artillery? Nasser was the first Third World leader to receive extensive arms from the Soviet Union, which has not regained its position in Egypt since his death. Arrns aid has not given the Sovietsany measure of political influence in Iraq. Even today, Syria maintains its distance despite a continuing need for weapons. In the face of evidence, the allegation that Libya is anyone's "satellite" does not hold water. Kaddafi displayed his own evaluation of communism and stated frequently enough (in January 1981, for example). that they were "not communisfs". 40 Moscow and Tripoli differ. The assumption that the Soviets are "iri Libya"~ı is not only an Exaggeration -it is outright untruth.
Americanstrategists often assert that the Soviet Union plans to seize the oil reserves of the Middle East and the adjacent areas. The USSR has vast reserves of untapped oil within its own territory. Secondly, it has interest in maintaining the status quo, namely the flow of oil to the West because the denial of this important resource would only make the U.S. mare pugnacious. Because it cannot confess to the American public the extent to which the international economic system is responsible for the poverty' of the Third World, the U.S. is indined to explain unrest by the "outside agitator" thesis. The argument runs that events would conform to U.S. policies if it were not for Soviet or Libyan or Cuban "agitation". Third parties, such as the Swedish Petroleuro Studies Institute, have published reports rejecting the suggestion that the Soviet Union wou1d be an importer of oil by 1985; they maintain that the Soviets wou1d export a few million barrels per day even in 1990.
The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had proposed a security plan for the Gulf, designed to pledge the United States, the Soviet Union, Western European countries, the People's Republic of China and Japan to respect the independence of the Gwf States and their sovereign rights over their natural resources, not to use force or threaten force against the countries of the region and not to draw them into military alliances with states having nudear weapons. The Third World countries do not accept the "logic" that if one of them does not accept American preponderance, it must be acting as a proxy of the Soviets. Libyan leadership has frequently stated it wishes both fleets, U.S. and Soviet, to disappear from the Mediterranean.
THE "OUTLAW" STATE:
The Reagan Administration's criticism of Libya's relations with the Soviets is coupled with its accusation of the Jamahiriyaof fomenting international terrorism. was accused of fomenting "coups, revolutions, separatist movements and tcrrorism in dozens of countries around the world".44 Westem media sought to implicate Libya in several affairs, such as the Gafsa uprisirıg in Tunisia. A CIA-retired, now free-Iance writer inquires il1 arecent book whether Mehmet Ali Ağca, the Pope's would-be assassin, had passed on to Libya after having gone to Tunisia at the end of November 1980. 45 He asks: "What were the channels through which Ağca had been selected, trained, supported and guided"! Was it PLO, Qaddafy, Turkish rightists or East Europeans? Or all of them?"46 Georgetown University returned a $ 600,000 gift to the Libyan Govemment, saying that it did not want its name associated with a country that "supports terrorism". The gift was made to aid Arabstudies in the university.47 it was hel d for o11eyear and retumed on account of strong Zionist pres sure.
While labelling foreign opposition as "terrorists", the White House mounts its own military campaign abroad. it heaps threats on a number of countries, but invades Grenada and sen ds Marines to Lebanon. if the U.S. can charge Libya of interference in the domestic affairs of others, it should then be remembered that U.S. history, sirice the early decades of the Nineteenth Century, is a catalogue of interventions, the most recent examples of which range from Iran in 1953 to the current events in Lebanon, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Libya. it may be asserted that the U.S. practices terrorist methods in two ways: firstly, in terms of supporting regimes which indulge in terrorism, such as the junta in El Salvador or Zionism in Palestine, and secondly with a subversion program to destabilize the r€gimes it dislikes, such as the Soviet Union or Libya. it has even overthrown govemments irrespective of the fact that they might have been democratically elected -such as Allende in ChilC'.
The American military build-up around the Arab homeland is enOfn'ous. it was the Reagan Administration that stepped up U.S. milit3ry penetration of the Arab world. U.S. base facilities on Egyptian territory center on Ras Banas on the Red Sea Coast. Sharm al-Sheik (Ophira), Eitam and Etzion provide the infrastructure for the interventian force d{'stinel for the Gulf. With the backing of the Sultan Qabus regime in Oman, the U.S. has access to the military base on Masira Island. The U.S. has alsa provided capital for the development of the Omani naval ports rtt Mutrah (near Hormuz), Salaluh (near Democratic Yemen) and a smaIler airfield at Seeb (alsa near Hormuz). it has a base at Berbera 48 Libyan leadership differentiated between terrorism and social change; it opposed the former, but supported specifically defined national liberation movements. Warning that terrorism put an end to the great French Revolution, Kaddafi announced that he depIOl-ed the West German Baader-Meinhof Organization and the !talian Red Bri. gades. Supporting Spanish territorial integrity, he opposed the demand for secession made by the Basque organization E.T.A. Being in the Middle East and in Africa, it was entirely natural for Libya to be interested in the affairs of both. What is not as natural is American or French engagement with these regions considering that both these countries are geographically far away. They, nevertheless, argue that they have vİtal İnterests in other continents. This is a dual standard, which brands Libya as "terrorist" but rewards the other two with benevolence. To portray Libya as a country of "terrorists" is an exaggeration that still needs to be proved. In reply to accusation that Libya was organizing training camps for terrorist on its own soil, Kaddafi challenged the accusers to produce the evidence. When a Pakistani plane was hijacked in early 1981by individuals opposed to the rule of General Zia ul-Haq, Libya denied priorknowledge of the event, condemned it and refused the plane. Although Kaddafi favoured lrish independence from Britain, he expressed opposition to IRA terrorism. He secured the release of a French archaeologist held hostage by guerilla groups in Chad. Heappealed unsuccessfully to the Red Brigades in ltaly for the release of Aldo Moro. Even a CIA report concluded that there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the charge that the SoVİets are fomenting international terrorism. 49 The U.S. alsa freely speculated about a supposed Libyan mHitary nuclear ambition. Although no evidence wasproduced, Libya was accused 48 "Carlos on the Shores of Tripoli," Newsweek, February 23, 1981. 49 The New York Times, March 29,1981. , of building atomic arsenals. There were also suppositions in the AngloAmerican press that the most likely place for Libya to obtain nuclear weapons would be the Soviet Union. Such concem contrasted with Amer1can inactivity over Israeli and South' African quest for nuclear war potential. While American policy is to. let this cooperation go almost unnoticed, the whole world is following it with growing anxiety.5o
Indeed, the Atomic Energy Commission of Libya was set up in 1973. In the same year, Libya initialled an agreement with the Soviet Union for a 1,000 kilowatt research reactor. The next year, Argentina agreed to provide Libya with equipment and train chemists in the extraction and purification of uranium. In 1978, Libya made an agreement with India for university training in nuclear-plant management in exchange for oil. In 1980, Libya and the Soviet Union made another agreement for the construction of a 4,400,000 kilowatt nuclear plant. 5 ! Libya has the right to be self-sufficient in energy when oil runs out That country has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been conscientious in notifying the international community of agreements that have a bearing on nuclear energy. it also has the prerogative to seek ways of keeping abreast with modern science. It is unjust to single out Libya for criticism for conceiving nuclear energy as part of its energy requirements, knowing that oil reserves are not limitless.
LIBYAN OIL:
For a decade after the discovery of oil in May 1959 at Dahra in the Dirte Basin of Libya, that country faced the rapacity of big. business. Treating Libya as if it was their property, the oil companies took the lion's share. Under King Idris, the Westem oil companies cheated Libya into the worst possible terms for its oil.
On September 1, 1969, 34 international oil companies were operating 137 concessions, the majority of them in the Sirte basin. The RCC set up a special committee, headed by Abdussalam Jalloud who dealt with them one by one.o:!The committee first tackled the U.S. Occidental Company, which agreed to an immediate 30 cents rise to be boosted by 2 cents every year for five years. it also agreed to pay an additional 3 percent surtax on profits. Thereafter, all the other oil firms backed down.
Western mass media advanced false theories about the nature and causes of the oil crisis that follüwed the Octabel' War (1973). They have placed the main blame at the door of the oil-producing countries for pursuing a policy of regulation of oil extraction and price increases. They have accused the Arabs for using oil as a political weapon to secure a settlement of the Palestinian issue. They said that the oil-producing countries were responsible for the energy difficulties in Western Europe and the Third World. They saw in it the "hand of Moscow", shifting responsibility on the shoulders of the Soviet Union as welL. They argued that unless the monopolies raise the prices of oil, they would be ruined. Finally, they claimed that the oil crisis lied at the bottom of all the difficulties experienced by the Western economic system.
The "seven sisters" of the international petroleum cartep3 supply dose to four-fifth of all the oil imported and of all the oil products con-. sumed in the Western world. The cartel owns most of the refineries and the marketing network. it is these "seven sisters" and several 'Other oil monopolies that have camouflaged the true causes of the fuel crisis. To satisfy the current needs of economic development, the available resources of the world are adequate. The shortage of energy resources in many Western. countries is connected with the inflation that foIlowed the economic dedine in the United States. it is not the energy crisis that produced this dedine; the crisis is only a manifestation of the decline. In this cont~xt, the oil monopolies sought to keep the prices up in order to reap superprofits. on the other hand, regulating oil extraction is the lawful right of the producing countries. Price increases are also designed to establish a normal relation between the raw material and manufactured product prices. This policy might have undermined 'the pasition of the "seven sisters" and some other monopolies, which incidentaIly had earlier given their blessings to Israeli aggressions against the Arabs. Some Western governments and media have blamed the Arabs for using oil ;ıs a political weapon. But the U.S. has plotted intrigues, provoked warsand conducted coups in order to preserve the status quo in oil. The oil mODopoHesregard the energy crisis as a boon, because it provides the m with the excuse for inflating prices and raising profits. it is 'not the oil magnates that are ruined, but medium and smaIl companies.
Libyan leadership has frequently stated that it Wa!; prepared to use oil as a weapon to serve the causes of the Arab peaplf" in particular the causes of the Palestinians. if the West would respond to such policies by attacking the Jamahiriya, Ahmed Shahati, now Director of the Green Book Center in Tripali, said in 1981: "To defend oursdves and our Mnour, we would be willing to destroy all our wells and return to an economy based on agriculture".54 Western media has branded Libya as "militant" on account of the O.P.E.C. conference in Bali (Indonesia). But Libya had already announced on September 22, 1980, its decision to reduce crude oil production by 10 percent. Some other O.P.E.C. members such as Algeria, Iran, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates had alsa announced similar cuts. Nevertheless, Libya, along with Algeria, was identified as O.P.E.C.'s "hawks". On the other hand, non-O.P.E.C. producers like Britain and Norway gladly jumped on the O.P.E.C. band-wagon, raising their oil prices. Libya's increase of the oil prices has been within the agreed O.P.E.C. framework. Libya offered,on the other hand, special law prices to developing countries. Libya has been using oil revenue on development.
By 1980, Libya's oil revenues were over $20 billion, but for the mid-1981 to mid-1982 period they were less than half of the previous twelve months. 55 Government spending on the physical and social infrastructure had, to a great extent, satisfied the rising expectations of the Libyan people. Major investments had aıready been made, and consolidation was timely.
'
One mayalsa add here that Libya is no longer dependent on refined oil from outside. The Azzawiya refinery, which now supplies 70 percent of all oil products used in Libya, was opened in 1974. Plans have also been ma de for the extension of that refinery. The foundation stone of this gigantic petro-chemical development with its accompanying infrastructure was laid in mid-1980.
Western assertions that Libya has resorted to "blackmail" through oil is unsubstantiated. it is the U.S. that has long used the "food weapon" to bring the Third World countries into line with Washington's objectives. it is again the U.S. that has continued to keep open the door to vital commodities, such as oil. Libya, on the other hand, has supplied oil even to states with whose' policies in the Middle East and Africa it dashed. The United States is an example.
ARAB UNITY AND PALESTINE:
Quest for unity of the Arab homeland has been consistent with Libyan leadership since the overthrow of monarchy. Libyan or other Arab attemp1 
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TÜRKKAYA ATAÖV to inerge should be viewed in a historically recurring context. For instance, in the 1940's,the Syrian Ba'th Party called for Arab unity stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the. Gulf. Similarly, the Pan-Arab ideal became a goal of Nasser, who believed that different Arab countries s~ared a cUıture on which they could build their own system of cooperation and defense. In contrast to the American view that the Middle East was a land mass defenseless in front of the Soviet Union, Nasser considered Israel, the United States and the Soviets as foreigners in the region.
With the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961,however, the Arabs were less optimistic about the immediate prospects of Arab unity.56 In spite of this, Libya made repeated attempts at Arab unity even after the idea became less and less popular elsewhere among the Arabs. That country has called for unity, at different times, with Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Chad, Syria and Morocco. Libya believed that the present weakness of the Arabs and Israel's triumph over them were due to their disintegration into several entities, a process sustained by the colonial powers to dominate the Arab world and exploit their resources. On Sep.
• tember 16, 1969, Kaddafi described Arab unity, in a Benghazi address as "an inevitable necessity ... decisive historical reaction to the challenges of' Zionism and colonialism... necessary to protect the achievements of the Arab nation." He also stated, in an interview with al-Ayyam (Kartum) reprinted in al-Ra'id on December 6, 1969, that Libya did not have manpower to exploit its wealth and that Arab cohesion and the use of the capabilities of the other Arab peoples were inevitable. He stated that a unified Arab state in the Middle East and North Africa would probably have the veto right in the U.N. Security Council,57This was another secret of the enmity existing between Libya and the U.S.
Several of Libyan attemptshave indeed been failures. But there are difficulties facing any union. The U.S. itself once faced years of civil war threatening unity. The Western countries don't seem to be interested, however,. in examining the probl,em objectively. Some bastions of metropolitan culture and capital seem gener~lly hostile to the idea of Arab unity. They frequently remind, for instance, that Libya has a record of failures. They probably suspect that stronger Arab world will undermine American influence in the region. Western media frequentıy uses reports which give the reader the impression that quite few of the Arab governments are suspicious of merger proposals. But there are official statements of Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tunisia, South Yemen and the P.L.O., revealing support of the idea. After all, the African states have been committed to the ideal of unity, and the Common Market is a form of unity among a group of Western European States.
Libya and Syria (which has alsa been party to several unification schemes) proclaimed a merger in September 1980. Libya threatens U.S. interests in the Middle East via its merger plans with Syria. In Iate August 1984, "union" with Morocco, in spite of the differences in the political and the economic systems, has become a reality.
it is only natural for Libya to !ıave differences even with the progressive Arab regimes on issues of lesser importance. For .instance, Libyan support of one of the factions of Polisario, the liberatian movement of the Western Sahara, damaged its relations not only with Morocco, but alsa with A1geria, which supported an other faction. A1though it is true that Libya's policies have attracted the interests of the Pan-Arabists above all, Libya desires to have good relations with every country in the region. it has united with the Moroccan monarchy, cultivated good relations with the United Arab Emirates and frequently expressed the desire to improve relations with Tunisia.
The question of Palestinian rights is central to the quest of Arab unity. In the eyes of the Libyan Government, Palestine is part of the Arab lands, and Zionism is a foreign political mavement; the creators of Israel were motivated by hatred for Islam and a desire to e.xploit Arab resources. The Libyan Minister of Unity and Foreign Affairs, in a speech at the Arab Cultural Center as early as October 9, 1969, had declared: "He who supports the Palestine cause is a friend to the Arabs." The same person, in a statement to al-Tawrah on November 8, 1969, said that the Arabs ought to build their relations with other states on the basis of their pasition on this very 'cause.
Nothing has changed Libya's stand since 1969. Libya is still an unconditioned opponent of Zionism. That country knows that for the U.S., Israel comes first. Libya knows that an immediate consequence of Reagan's election had been the escalation of Israel's war against the Palestinians and its drive into Lebanon. Libya opposed, together with Syria, Reagan's Middle East "peace" initiative launched on September 1, 1982, and they both maintain that it is no better than the Camp' David framework. Libya faces Israel not only in the Eastern Mediterranean through its dose ass0-ciation with Syria, but also in Africa. When in 1983 American firepower struck positions in Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon, this was the' first U.S. naval bombardment in the Mediterranean since World War II.
At the beginning of December, the U.S. lauhched its first direct attack against Syrian forees. WhethE:r or not this was in response to concentrated Syrian anti-aircraft shooting at the U.S. reconnaissance jets over Lebanon, this brought not only Syrian, but also Libyan views and interest in collusion with those of the U.S. Facing Ziomst influence more directly in Africa, Libya replaced Israeli technical aid with its own financial aid in Black Africa.
THE JAMAHIRIYA AND CHAD:
The events in Chad may be viewed within the context of American efforts to destabilize the Jamahiriya. American policyaimed at discrediting Libya in the eyes of the world, to pressure some African countries to seek closer relations with the West and to persuade lfrance for a more interventionist strategy. Although Libya's support was for the international1y-recognized government of Chad, the Western media presented it as a sinister move on the part of the Jamahiriya. Libyan presence in Chad took place in the "interventibmst elimate" created by France and the United States. The French forces were in the Ce~tral African Republic, Cameroon, Senegal and Gabon. Foreign intervention was mu1ti-dimensional in Chad. France militarily intervented, and the re certainly was Egypt.ion involvement. The major part of the Egyptian army faced Libya rather than Israe1. 58 The U.S. seems less interested in Chad than the opportunity the crisis offers to criticise Libya. Reagan's statement that Chad was not their main sphere of influence but that of France is a challenge to the Third World countries, which reject the argument of dividing the nonaligned states into various spheres. 59 Over the past few years, the United States had refrained from overt intervention in North Africa, entrusting the policing of Western interests the re to France. In addition to the strategic Djibouti at the mouth of the Red Sea, France had troops in a number of African countries. lt also has special .intervention umts -the 11th Parachute Division (in Pau in Southern France), the 9th Marine Infantry Division and the Foreign Legion. Three parachute regiments are also on the alert in Southern France and Corsica.
France realizes the importance of Chad's geo-strategic position. Its interest extends also to a concern for continued control of uranium in neighbouring Niger and in Chad as well. Although one of the ten least developed countries in the world, it is known to be rich in. deposits of 53 Chad has been going through a state of civil war since independence. it is a heterogenous country, bo'th in terms of race and religion: the north and east are inhabited by Moslem Arabs and the south by Catholic Blacks. The frontiers, subject to ethnical disputes, were drawn by the colonialists to suit their agreements. it is worth remembering at this point that the Ottoman Empire treated northern Chad as part of its North African provinces. The Libyans considered the addition of the Aouzou strip along the border to their territory in 1975 as a rectification, disputed even by the Italians. In the 1920s and the 1930s, the Libyan resistance fighters found refuge in Chad, where the re has been long-standing ethnic ties as welL. GO When Chad was granted its independence in 1960, it became a Republic within the French community. François Tombalbaye, its first President,. who turned to be an autocratic ruler, pursued a policy of repression, felt especially by the Moslem population. He imposed the absolute domination of non-Moslem tribes, particularly of his own Sara tribe. 62 The National Liberation Front (Frolinat) was formed in 1966 with the declared aim to overthrow this regime. 63 Goukouni Weddey~(also spelled as Queddei), Chairman of the Frolinat, stated that no school or hospital had been opened in Chad in the twenty years since independence and that there were only five trained accountants in the country.64
The struggle continued until Frolinat marched towards the capital and Felix Maloum, who had replaced Tombalbaye, was forced to escape. A Chad National Unity Pact was signed on August 21, 1979 , and Weddeye became Prime Minister of the provisional government. Hussein Hibre, a member of the Qira'an tribe, was made Minister of Defence. The latter used his position as Defence Minister to appoint himself as Premier by force. When fighting between his forces and those of the government spread all over the country, the legitimate government, depending on the mutual defence agreement (1980) between Chad and Libya, sought heIp from its northern neighbour. From the legal view, the Libyan case was 1rrefutable. The President of the legitimate government had asked for the assistance of another legitimate government for purposes of defence. There is no evidenc,e to support the American' allegation that Libya has used Chad as a staging area for thrusts against other lightly defended states. Principally American sources had claimed that Chad was the first stage in Kaddafi's plan of further penetration into Africa, that Libya was a "Soviet long arm" in the continent and that Libya intended to use Chad to topple the regime in Sudan and, allied with Ethiopia and South Yemen, to encircle Egypt. A Christian Scieuce Monitor report 65 described Libya in Chad as a "Soviet Trojan horse." Another report 66 suggested that sevel'a! neighbours of Libya would probably welcome American influence to frustrate "Libyan expansion". There were no Soviet advisors in Chad; not a single Western reporter referred to any Soviet personnel there. Although some cirdes 67 alleged that Kaddafi had plans for "a greater Saharan empire", they produced no evidence to support this assumption. An International Herald Tribune' editorial agreed that the French could "arrange" an intervention in the same area. In other words, France could pursue a neo-colonialist policy in central Africa, but Libya, itself a country of that continent, could not entertain plans of unity with neighbours.
When the rebel forces of Habre were defeated, the Libyan fare es withdrew from Chad -again at the request of the legitimate Chad Government, thus falsifying claims of those who doubted Libya's intentions.
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They withdrew after accomplishing the mission of restoring security and after building much-needed roads and schools, digging wells and bringing electricity to some areas. Even cirdes unsympathetic to Libya should concede that Libyan presence in Chad has been legitimate, and that neighbouring Libya is perhaps the only country able and willing to provide the financial means to get Chad onto its feet. When the war ended, there was very little about this in the world press, as well as its favourable effects on the couI1try. While Libya' was pulling its troops from Chad, the United States and France maintained their military presence in a number of states around Libya. A dedaration of unity between Libya and Chad was announced a few weeks after the defeat of the rebels. The propose d merger gaye Libya's critics an opportunity to draw unfair parallels and accuse Tripali of being a "pawn of the Kremlin".
During the vacuum; however, between the Libyan withdrawal and the advent of the Afriean peacekeeping forees, Habre seized a large portion of Chad territory, with ample military assistance from Egypt and Sudan, and through them from the United States. The lawful government, which went into the counter-offensive, was supported by Libya and France for different reasons. Libya helped the lawful government because it wanted to prevent Chad from becoming what it would regard as a bastion of the U.S. and the African reactionary regimes, which would threaten Libya's. security. France considered the same government as a better guarantee of her interests in Chad than Habre. To ensure Habre's' political survival, beginning with 1981 "through the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) -sponsored networks running from Langley to Cairo, from Cairo to Khartoum and ultimately to Abeche and beyond, automatic weapons, ammunition, vehides, fatigues and boots and, above all, cash flowed into Habre's hands.'>e9Making use of these resources, Habre cam.
